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This paper endeavours to illuminate the political and institutional
factors that can help explain differing degrees of fiscal retrench-
ment in European Union countries for the time period 1990-2001.
Several variants of the partisan approach and the veto players
framework are elucidated and applied to the question of budgetary
consolidation. These elaborations yield five working hypotheses
which are empirically tested using a time-series cross-section data
set of 14 EU countries. The results lend support to the notion that
partisan preferences and institutional veto players interact to shape
budgetary retrenchment in a rather counterintuitive way. 
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1. Introduction
Since the economic downturn in 2001, major policy debates in
Europe have repeatedly revolved around the question of fiscal defi-
cits and their containment. Since then, several member countries of
the European Union have been repeatedly in breach of the provi-
sions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
2. These violations
have spawned not only domestic and EU-wide discussions on the
pros and cons of the pact, but have also led to some revisions in
2005 that prolonged the list of mitigating circumstances (Alves and
Alfonso 2007). The SGP clarifies and enshrines the fiscal conver-
gence criteria originally laid out in the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in
1992. It mandates that the fiscal deficit of every country participat-
ing in the European Monetary Union (EMU) shall not exceed 3%
per year. Repeated breach of this stipulation can result in heavy
fines of up to 0.5% of a country’s GDP.
While public debates on the SGP usually focus on countries that
have exceeded the deficit ceiling, it has to be pointed out that a
great number of EU countries have been highly successful in redu-
cing their deficits in the 1990s. For example, Finland and Great Bri-
tain suffered from budget deficits in excess of 7% of GDP in 1993,
and both managed to turn these into surpluses by 1998. Other coun-
tries such as Germany or Portugal only moderately reduced their de-
ficits in the middle of the 1990s and saw them rise again at the end
of the decade. Hence, even though average deficits in the EU have
decreased from over 6% of GDP in 1993 to almost zero in 2001,
there is still a wide variety of outcomes. The existence of the
Maastricht convergence criteria and the SGP alone cannot explain
these different developments. Rather, instead of being an explana-
tion in itself, the fiscal criteria of the TEU and SGP provide an ex-
ternal constraint
3  on the fiscal policies of member states. The
strength of this restriction depended, of course, on a country’s initial
budgetary situation and its willingness to join the Eurozone at the
target date. In conjunction with the recession that hit Europe at the
beginning of the 1990s and which led to burgeoning deficits, they
2   France, Germany, Portugal and, as it turned out recently, also Greece.
3   Even though Denmark, Sweden and the UK are not members of the Euro-
zone and, thus, do not have to fear the sanctions of the SGP, they still do parti-
cipate in the annual budgetary review procedure by the European Commission
(EC) and would face (non-binding) recommendations by the EC if they were
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provided a strong motivation for all governments to attempt fiscal
consolidation. 
Therefore, the EU countries in the run-up to the introduction of the
Euro provide a unique framework for asking which political and in-
stitutional factors determine a country’s ability to reduce its fiscal
deficit. This is the overall question that motivates this paper. Spe-
cifically, since much of the literature shows that economic variables,
like real growth or the unemployment rate, alone do not suffice to
explain divergent deficit outcomes (e.g. Alesina and Perotti 1995;
Franzese 2002a; De Wolff 1998; Woo 2003), this paper tries to illu-
minate which political and institutional factors may account for the
observed differences. 
Note that the focus here is exclusively on determinants of deficit re-
duction
4. While there is a large existing literature on the determin-
ants of the occurrence of deficits and debts (e.g. Roubini and Sachs
1989a, b; De Haan and Sturm 1997; Sakamoto 2001), much less at-
tention has been paid to the factors that influence the decision to re-
duce a fiscal deficit. Most studies rather deal with the economic
consequences of fiscal adjustments (Alesina and Ardagna 1998;
Alesina et.al. 2002) or their compositions (Ardagna 2004; Mulas-
Granados 2003). One exception is a recent working paper by Ales-
ina et.al. (2006) that empirically tests determinants of fiscal reform
decisions.
5 The authors, however, do not explicitly focus on the EU
but on developing and developed countries in general.
In analysing fiscal adjustment decisions, standard political economy
models are briefly introduced, discussed and empirically tested us-
ing time-series cross-section data (TSCS) of 14 EU countries
6 for
the time period 1990-2001. In particular, the implications of two ap-
proaches, the partisan theory and the veto-player approach, are dis-
4   As has been shown before (Alesina and Perotti 1997; Alesina, Perotti and
Tavares 1998; Alesina and Ardagna 1998), successful deficit reduction was
mainly achieved by slashing government expenditure, not so much by raising
revenues. That is why I also speak of fiscal retrenchment when talking about
deficit reduction.
5   I would like to than an anonymous reviewer, for bringing this paper to my
attention.
6   Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK. Luxembourg has been and
throughout will be omitted, for it is the only EU country that has almost no
government debt, high fiscal surpluses throughout the period under considera-
tion and negative interest payments. 7 European Political Economy Review 
cussed. These models look at the policy-oriented preferences of act-
ors as well as the institutional constraints that actors are facing
when making decisions. The results show that domestic political
forces and institutional structures continue to play a decisive role in
shaping budgetary outcomes despite the often heralded argument of
policy convergence due to globalization.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces to several
partisan and veto player models, relating them to the question of
fiscal consolidation.  The third section introduces the relevant defin-
itions and variables. Section 4 then proceeds to the empirical testing
of the different models, employing time-series cross-section ana-
lyses. Section 5 reviews the analysis carried out in this paper, sums
up the results and draws some conclusions.
2. Political Economy Explanations 
This section develops the theoretical underpinnings of our partisan
and institutional hypotheses. We start of with the simple partisan
model by Hibbs which is the earliest model, and then proceed to the
more recent advances.
2.1 Adaptive Partisan Models
The partisan theory has been originally formulated by Douglass
Hibbs (1977) and was extended later on to incorporate rational ex-
pectations (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997). It assumes that
policy makers care about the policies to be implemented, which is a
marked contrast to classical Downsian models, where politicians
care solely about winning elections or maximizing vote shares. The
model’s point of departure is the observation that different socio-
economic groups are differently affected by growth, unemployment
and inflation. Hibbs (1977: 1468; 1987: p.87), presenting evidence
for the U.S., shows that inflation actually benefits lower income
groups and has an equalizing impact on income distribution. Unem-
ployment, on the other hand, shifts income from the poorest two
quintiles to the richest two quintiles. Hibbs (1977: 1470) also
presents   survey   evidence   which   indicates   that   socio-economic
groups indeed utter subjective preferences over inflation and unem-Pamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  8
ployment that are broadly in line with their objective economic situ-
ations. As a result, low and medium wage earners prefer low unem-
ployment (which is brought about by high economic growth) and
accept higher inflation in return, whereas asset holders and people
with above average wages prefer low inflation paid for by higher
unemployment. 
Now, common sense holds it that in the political arena low and me-
dium income earners are usually represented by left-wing parties,
while upper-middle and upper classes are broadly represented by
right-wing parties. Analysing cross-national evidence for 12 West-
ern countries as well as time-series evidence for the U.S. and the
UK, Hibbs (1977: 1468) arrives at the conclusion “that the macroe-
conomic policies pursued by left- and right-wing governments are
broadly in accordance with the objective economic interests and the
subjective preferences of their class-defined core political constitu-
encies.” 
In the partisan model the economy is characterized by an (old-fash-
ioned) exploitable Phillips-curve relationship between inflation and
unemployment.
yt = ŷ + πt - πt
e (1)
where yt is the realized economic growth rate, ŷ denotes the natural
growth rate and πt - πt
e is the difference between realized and expec-
ted inflation. Expectations are presumed to be adaptive such that πt
e
= πt-1. Macroeconomic policies thus follow a simple logic: if a left
party wins the election, then, in line with the preferences of its con-
stituency, it will strive to lower the unemployment rate. The result
will be stronger economic growth and higher inflation. If the right-
wing party wins the next election, it will act in accordance with its
voters’ preferences for low inflation. The consequence will be a re-
cession where unemployment grows and inflation falls. It is import-
ant to emphasize that Hibbs does not consider any shifts in the
short-run Phillips-curve due to adjustments in expectations. Accord-
ing to his view, the short-run is long enough to cover the lenght of
the legislative term.
2.2 Rational Partisan Models
Whereas  the  original   formulation   by   Hibbs  assumed   adaptive
preferences, more  recent revisions  of  the theory  incorporating9 European Political Economy Review 
rational expectations have been proposed by Alesina, Roubini and
Cohen (1997). In their approach, voting is prospective based on a
given set of information: πt
e =E(πt | I t-1). Hence, voters not only anti-
cipate the policies the respective parties would pursue once elected,
but also the probability distribution that the left- or the right-wing
party will win the election. Given these probabilities and the pre-
sumption that voters are rational and forward looking, the elector-






where p is the probability that L wins and accordingly (1-p) denotes
the probability that R wins the election; π
L* and π
R* capture the two
parties’ inflation policies. Hence, voters take the average of both
parties’ policies weighted by their respective probabilities of win-
ning as their expected inflation rate that will occur after the election,
i.e. this is an average expectation. If party L wins, realised inflation
will be higher than expected. Therefore, unemployment will be tem-
porarily lower. Given rational expectations, however, voters will ad-
just wage and credit contracts in the next period to the higher infla-
tion rate, thus the short-run Phillips curve will shift upwards bring-
ing the economy back to the long-run equilibrium unemployment
rate. Overall inflation will have risen. The case of a right-wing
electoral victory is reverse of that logic.
In such a rational model, partisan effects on growth and unemploy-
ment are only short-lived. Once expectations have adjusted, the
only thing that distinguishes left- from right-wing parties is the level
of inflation. Hence, the difference between the traditional Hibbs’
model and the rational expectations model lies in the persistence of
partisan effects. The latter approach predicts a much shorter dura-
tion of post-electoral expansions and recessions. Empirical studies
have not yet decided, however, which of the two approaches de-
scribes reality more accurately. While Alesina, Roubini and Cohen
(1997: 108, 174) find evidence in favour of the rational model,
Franzese (2002b: 401-405) is more sceptical, arguing that in most
cases the traditional model can explain observed patterns equally
well.
In principle, a government can use monetary and/or fiscal policy to
implement its partisan goals regarding output, inflation and unem-
ployment. As the standard Mundell-Fleming model predicts and asPamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  10
several authors have investigated empirically (Boix 2000; Oatley
1999; Clark and Hallerberg 2000), in an open economy with free
capital flows, the choice of the exchange rate regime becomes cru-
cial in determining which policy instruments are still viable. Under
fixed exchange rates, fiscal policy, (and thus increasing and lower-
ing deficits) is still effective in managing the economy while under
floating exchange rates it is not. The reverse is true for monetary
policy.
That governments try to take advantage of these opportunities has
been empirically corroborated. Boix (2000: 66) presents evidence
for a sample of OCED nations covering the period 1960-1993,
which shows that under unrestricted capital mobility countries with
fixed exchange rate regimes had on average significantly higher
fiscal deficits than countries with a floating currency. There is also
some tentative empirical evidence that governments dominated by
the left run larger deficits under fixed exchange rate regimes than
right-wing governments (Boix 2000: 66; Oatley 1999: 1014).
Therefore one can presume that partisan fiscal policy is possible
even under perfect capital mobility, given that exchange rates are
fixed
7. From this and from the prior discussion about the two partis-
7   This applies to most of the countries and the time period considered in this
paper. In particular, the Eurozone can be considered such a fixed exchange
rate regime. However, three countries in our sample do not take part in the
common currency area: Denmark, whose currency is pegged to the Euro via
the European Exchange rate Mechanism (ERM), using a fluctuation band of
2,25%, and the UK and Sweden which have free floating exchange rates.
Moreover, before the creation of the Euro in 1999, almost all Eurozone mem-
bers had their exchange rates pegged within the ERM. After the ERM crisis in
1992-1993, the fluctuation bands were widened from 2,25% to 15%, and Italy
and the UK left the system (for a lengthy discussion see Tsoukalis 1997: 152-
162). Yet, even with the wide fluctuation bands, the system could still be con-
sidered a fixed exchange rate regime, since “the nine countries which re-
mained in the ERM plus Austria which joined in January 1995 and Finland in
October 1996 (followed by Italy one month later), chose not to take advantage
of the wider margins of fluctuation in their monetary policy” (Tsoukalis 1997:
160). Furthermore, even though the UK and Sweden have flexible exchange
rates, independent fiscal policies are still possible if central banks accommod-
ate the government policy by increasing the money supply. One needs to re-
member that the Bank of England became independent only in 1997, whereas
the  Swedish   Riksbank  has   a   comparably  low   degree  of   independence
(Daniels, Nourzad and van Hoose 2004). Also, the fact that a policy proves in-
effective may not prevent a government from trying it. 11 European Political Economy Review 
an models, we can conclude that different parties once elected not
only have different preferences, but we can also assume that they
have, at least theoretically, the fiscal policy means available to pur-
sue their ends. Therefore, we would expect left governments not
only to pursue a more expansionary fiscal policy and to run bigger
fiscal deficits, but also to reduce deficits less than their right-wing
counterparts. The partisan approach is therefore perfectly amenable
to our question of retrenchment decisions. Thus, the first working
hypothesis is:
H1:  The higher the share of left-wing party seats in a government,
the less likely is that government to engage in fiscal retrenchment. 
The reason is that even with an external constraint such as the SGP,
the left’s preference according to the partisan model is always to in-
crease output as much as possible. The right-wing party, on the oth-
er hand, likes low inflation and is thus much more ready to retrench
the budget. Note that we need not to distinguish between the tradi-
tional partisan model and the rational one because we are only con-
cerned here with policy instruments, not with actual economic out-
comes. Hence, the magnitude and persistence of the real economic
effects of these fiscal policies are of no concern here.
An alternative partisan approach emphasizes the strategic role that
debt  may   play   in   constraining   a future government’s  latitude
(Aghion and Bolton 1990; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Milesi-Fer-
etti and Spoalore 1994; Persson and Svensson 1989). The basic no-
tion of this approach is that a right-wing government with rational
foresight might expect electoral defeat. Given that it does not like
the policies that a left-wing successor government could implement,
it may choose to accumulate debt. This way it forces the future gov-
ernment to spend resources on servicing the debt instead of pursu-
ing ideological goals such as stimulating the economy or increasing
social spending. Persson and Svensson (1989: 341) emphasize that
the logic of this argument is perfectly symmetric: “a ‘stubborn’ lib-
eral would choose to borrow less if it knew if would be succeeded
by a more conservative government.” This way, the left government
could lower debt servicing costs or even create additional funds if it
leaves surpluses to the future government, thus increasing future
government spending. Pamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  12
As a result, this model yields the rather counterintuitive prediction
that the right is more likely to run deficits, while the left is more
prone to reduce them. It follows as a second hypothesis:
H2: The higher the share of right-wing party seats in a government,
the less likely is that government to engage in fiscal retrenchment.
2.3 Veto Player Models
Having elucidated possible effects of partisan preferences, it is time
to turn to the role of political institutions. The fundamental goal of
veto player models (Tsebelis 1995: 2000) is to explain policy stabil-
ity and policy change, employing the tools and intuition of spatial
models of voting. The focus lies on the decision-making process of
political actors. Strategic interaction between them is therefore
largely neglected. Given a certain amount of information, this ap-
proach aims at enabling the researcher to predict specific legislative
outcomes of the political process.
Veto players are all those actors that have the constitutionally as-
signed power to veto a policy proposal in the legislative process,
may they be institutional (e.g. different chambers of parliament) or
partisan (e.g. different parties in parliament or in government) in
nature. Moreover,  veto players can be individual (such as a presid-
ent or a monolithic party controlling the parliament) or collective
(such as a parliament or a government composed of several parties
that have to determine their position by using some kind of decision
rule). Other actors, like interest groups for instance, that have no
formal veto power assigned to them by a country’s constitution but
do exhibit informal influence on the political process are excluded
from the analysis.
The fundamental insight of this approach is that policy stability and
policy change depend crucially on the size of the win set
8 and the
core
9. The bigger the size of the win set, the more feasible alternat-
8   The win set of a given status quo z (written W(z)) contains all policy posi-
tions that are preferred by a majority (however defined) of actors in a pairwise
voting procedure to the status quo.
9   The core contains all policy positions that cannot be defeated employing a
given decision-making rule. Note, that the core is only equal to the pareto set,
if the employed decision-making procedure is unanimity (then, we speak of
the unanimity core). Once, some other form of majority voting is used, the
core is different from the pareto set. However, most of the time the unanimity13 European Political Economy Review 
ives exist to the status quo, and consequently, the more likely is a
policy change. On the other hand though, the bigger the size of the
core, the more policy positions exist that cannot be changed, and
hence the less likely is a policy change
10. 
As a result, policy stability and policy change are functions of the
sizes of the core and the winset.
11 These are affected in turn by the
ideological distance between veto players, their number and their
internal cohesion. However, of these three variables, only the num-
ber of veto players can be easily operationalized in empirical stud-
ies, since so far there is no data available that measures internal co-
hesion of parties. With respect to ideological distance, there are
some studies (Cusack 1997; 1999; Franzese 2002a) that try to meas-
ure this variable by creating indices that capture the “Centre of
Gravity” of parties. Yet, even these measures rely on expert judge-
ments that try to order parties on a left-right scale. Given that exact
distances become crucial for this analysis, it is doubtful that experts
can exactly locate parties’ positions. As a result, the number of veto
players emerges as the only variable that can be readily observed by
examining a country’s constitution and the parties acting within the
political system. Moreover, in his empirical analysis, Franzese
(2002a, pp. 175-178) finds that once one controls for the number of
veto players, their ideological distance becomes statistically insigni-
ficant.
Applying this framework to the question of fiscal retrenchment, we
would expect that on average the likelihood of fiscal retrenchment
decreases as the number of institutional veto players increases.
Thus, the third hypothesis posits:
H3:  The higher the number of institutional veto players, the less
likely is a country to engage in fiscal retrenchment, and the smaller
is its deficit reduction.
core will be used given that the very concept of a veto player entails that he
cannot be overruled.
10   Note, however, that the size of the win set and the core are “a necessary but
not sufficient condition for proximity of the new policy with the status quo”
(Tsebelis 2002: 32) Hence, even though a large win set makes a policy far
away from the status quo possible, it does not rule out that the new policy rep-
resents only an incremental change from the status quo.
11   Note that core and win set almost always behave equivalently, with the win
set shrinking as the core expands  and vice versa (Tsebelis 2002: 29). Pamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  14
It is worthwhile to emphasize that this hypothesis does not imply
that countries with a high number of veto players do necessarily
have high deficits and debts. Theoretically, many veto players could
lead to low deficits because huge spending increases or tax cuts are
prevented by the small win set that is likely to exist in a system with
many veto players. But one could also arrive at the opposite predic-
tion: a government may be forced to make huge side-payments to
other veto players in order to achieve its goals. This reasoning could
lead one to expect that many veto players are associated with high
deficits. All what is claimed here is that an increasing number of
veto players is associated with an increasing stability of the status
quo (which is a budget deficit), and therefore make fiscal retrench-
ment harder to achieve.
2.4 War of Attrition Models
So far, we have considered the cabinet of a government to be a
monolithic actor. However, very often the government is composed
of more than one party, and agenda setting power in almost all cases
rests with the cabinet. Thus, intra-governmental dynamics may have
an impact on fiscal retrenchment. Starting with two seminal articles
by Roubini and Sachs (1989a, b), a large empirical literature has
emerged since the beginning of the 1990s, which examines the im-
pact of government fractionalisation on deficits. Yet, the empirical
findings have been mixed. Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b), who used
an ordinal variable to distinguish between single- coalition- and
minority governments, found that the higher the number of parties
in government, the higher the deficits. Edin and Ohlsson (1991) in-
sisted that this finding can be completely attributed to the effects of
minority governments. Hence, only minority governments run par-
ticularly high deficits. Still other, more recent empirical analyses
yielded no significant relationship between the number of govern-
ment parties and fiscal deficits (de Haan and Sturm 1997; de Haan,
Sturm and Beekhuis 1999; Sakamoto 2001). Also, most of these
studies do not distinguish properly between levels of deficits and
the process of fiscal retrenchment.
Deficit reduction has been explicitly analysed in a more theoretical
literature that has also emerged at the beginning of the 1990s (Ales-
ina and Drazen 1991; Spoalore 1993). These authors model intra-
governmental negotiations between coalition partners over fiscal re-15 European Political Economy Review 
trenchment as a “war of attrition”
12. The basic notion is that every
coalition party would like to shift the burden of fiscal adjustment
onto the other parties’ constituencies. As a consequence, every co-
alition member has an incentive to block a solution and tries to wait
the others out. Thus, no fiscal retrenchment takes place, although
everyone agrees that it is necessary. This situation is only resolved
if one or several partners give in and bear a disproportionate burden
of the costs.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) develop a war of attrition model where
two societal groups bargain over who has to bear the costs of fiscal
consolidation in a small open economy. Yet, their analysis also
holds for coalition partners instead of socio-economic groups, if we
assume that different parties represent different groups. At time t, an
exogenous shock leads to a fall in government revenues and thus a
deficit. The deficit is financed in part (1- η) by issuing debt and an-
other fraction η is financed via distortionary taxation (such as an in-
flation tax for instance). Debt is therefore,
d(t) = (1- η) [rd(t)+gt-1] (3)
where d denotes debt, r is the (constant) world interest rate and gt-1
describes the level of government spending before the exogenous
shock occurs. Note that Alesina and Drazen (1991) assume that
fiscal consolidation occurs through increases in taxation. However,
their arguments and results also hold, if we presume that the deficit
will be lowered by reducing government spending, which is the fo-
cus of this paper.
13 Consequently, a retrenchment takes place when
expenditure is lowered to such an extent that the level of debt will
remain constant, that is, deficits are reduced to zero
14: 
gt = τt - rdt (4)
with subscript t denoting the time when the retrenchment takes
place and τ being the tax rate which will remain unchanged. Now,
12   War of attrition models have been extensively used to describe conflict situ-
ations between labour unions and central banks (Backhus and Driffill 1985a,
b; Tabellini 1988), as well as between fiscal and monetary policy makers (Ta-
bellini 1987).
13  As a result, in contrast to Alesina and Drazen, taxes remain constant while ex-
penditures are the decisive variable here.
14  The model assumes for simplicity that there is no economic growth.Pamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  16
the bargaining between the coalition members starts over who has
to bear the expenditure cuts. More precisely, given that all parties
have different constituencies, it needs to be decided which societal
group will get less of future public spending.
15 The utility function u
that each party i maximizes is
ui,t = ci,t - y - Ki,t (5)
where c is private consumption, y captures income which is as-
sumed to be constant throughout, and K is the cost for every party
(and its followers) to live another instant in an economy that is in
deficit. K differs between the parties and is given by
Ki,t = φi τt (6)
in which φ captures the utility loss due to the distortionary taxation
(the inflation tax) that is partially used to cover the deficit. As be-
comes clear from (6), the welfare costs of an economy in debt in-
creases linearly with the level of taxes one has to pay. Once the fisc-
al retrenchment takes place, Ki=0. 
Of course, the longer the coalition members wait to enact a re-
trenchment, the more the situation deteriorates and the higher are
therefore the future costs of retrenchment. In addition, there are also
political costs associated with fighting for a solution that favours
ones own clientele. Now, every party will block a solution as long
as the marginal benefit from waiting is higher than the marginal cost
of distortions associated with the accumulation of debt. The margin-
al benefit is defined by the probability that the opponent(s) will give
in very soon times the higher utility that is derived from winning the
war of attrition, which is the smaller retrenchment costs the winner
has to pay compared to the loser(s). It is important to stress that
each party only knows its own costs of living in a state of accelerat-
ing debt. If everyone knew each others’ costs of waiting, then every-
body could calculate each others’ time until concession takes place,
and the war of attrition would not take place, since the ”loser”
15  If different constituencies are geographically defined, this could mean that some
group will get less public goods, like new infrastructure, in the future. If they are
defined in socio-economic terms, than this could mean that some will get less
government transfers in the future.17 European Political Economy Review 
would know from the beginning that he is the loser and would
hence immediately give in to save the costs of living in a distorted
economy.
In applying war of attrition models directly to coalition govern-
ments, Spoalore (1993) finds, that deficit reduction takes longer to
be agreed on, the higher the number of coalition partners, whereas
single-party governments react much quicker and more decisively.
In the context of the model by Alesina and Drazen (1991), this is
explained by the fact that a high number of parties increases the
probability that there are at least two parties with high marginal be-
nefits derived from waiting, being in a deadlock. This deadlock will
only be resolved when all parties but one concede, with the last
party holding out being the winner. Moreover, the more parties
there are, the higher is fractionalisation, and thus the more unequal
is the societal distribution of the costs of retrenchment. As explic-
ated above, this inequity leads, ceteris paribus, to a longer delay in
deficit reduction. Note, that we can also expect consolidation to be
smaller than is prescribed by standard tax-smoothing arguments be-
cause the parties may be tempted to retrench less in order to lower
the burden the loser(s) have to bear in an attempt to induce the
loser(s) to concede faster. As a result, we can formulate the final hy-
pothesis:
H4: The higher the number of parties that participate in govern-
ment, the less likely a fiscal retrenchment will be.
2.5 Interaction of Partisan and Institutional Factors
Even though most studies look at partisan and institutional factors
separately, it seems nonetheless plausible to expect that they are
conditioning each other. Indeed, Shepsle (1979) maintained in his
seminal article that preferences and political institutions conspire to
yield structure induced equilibria. Therefore, we are led to expect
that, for example, a high fragmentation of decision making power
could induce partisan actors to behave differently as compared to a
situation where power is more concentrated. Hence, a great number
of veto players will most likely necessitate some kind of comprom-
ise, thus moderating partisan behaviour. The precise effect will de-Pamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  18
pend on whether hypothesis 1 or 2 holds true. But in general, we
can state
H5: The presence of a high number of veto players augments the
partisan behaviour of governments.
Before we can proceed to the next section in which all hypotheses
will be empirically tested, we reiterate them in table 1.
Table 1: Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Theoretical explanation
H1:The higher the share of left-wing
party seats in a government, the less
likely is that government to engage in
fiscal retrenchment.
traditional/rational partisan approach
H2: The higher the share of right-wing
party seats in a government, the less
likely is that government to engage in
fiscal retrenchment.
partisan / debt as a strategic variable
H3: The higher the number of institu-
tional veto players, the less likely is a
country to engage in fiscal retrench-
ment, and the smaller is its deficit re-
duction.
veto players approach / spatial model
H4: The higher the number of parties
that participate in government, the less
likely is a fiscal retrenchment.
veto players approach / war of attrition
model
H5: The presence of a high number of
veto players augments the partisan be-
haviour of governments.
partisan  veto players
3. Definition of Variables and Data 
3.1 Definition and Composition of Retrenchment
Before we can proceed, it is necessary to point out how “retrench-
ment” is measured and defined in the following empirical analyses.
Two indicators are of importance: First, “government outlays” is the
annual expenditure of a country measured in per cent of GDP.
Second, to measure the annual (general)
16 government fiscal deficit,
16   Using the general government deficit (as opposed to central government fig-
ures) provides a more complete picture, since it also includes sub-national de-19 European Political Economy Review 
i.e. the difference between revenues and expenditures, the “structur-
al” (“cyclically-adjusted”) deficit
17 is used. 
As a number of studies point out, for a retrenchment to be long last-
ing, i.e. one that is not reversed within a few years, the fiscal adjust-
ment has to “rely mostly (or exclusively) on spending cuts (…),
[whereas] short-lived adjustments rely mostly on revenue increases”
(Alesina, Perotti and Tavares 1998: 200). Given these insights, a
rather strict definition of what constitutes a lasting fiscal retrench-
ment in the EU countries between 1990 and 2001 will be employed.
In doing so, a combination of both the structural deficit and govern-
ment outlays will be used. The former is needed to control for busi-
ness cycle movements, the latter is used to detect those consolida-
tions that are exclusively based on increases in revenues. The first
definition thus stipulates: Only those instances in which a country
reduced its structural deficit and/or its government outlays (keeping
the other variable constant) for at least 5 years in a row shall count
as a period of real fiscal retrenchment. 
18
Applying this definition to our EU-14 data for the period 1990-2001
yields the results shown in table 2. The table indicates which coun-
tries underwent periods of retrenchment. Furthermore, the third
column shows by how much the cyclically adjusted government
balance has improved during the period of retrenchment, whereas
column 4 depicts by how much government outlays were reduced.
By definition, if the improvement in the structural balance is higher
than the reduction  in  government  outlays,  then the difference
between the two indicate an increase in government revenues. For
instance, the fact that Belgium’s and Italy’s reductions in govern-
ment expenditure were much lower then their increases in their gov-
ficits as well as deficits in social security funds. Hence, differences in welfare
state arrangements and the constitutional structure (federal vs. unitary) are ac-
counted for.  
17   This indicator estimates the fiscal deficit that would prevail if the economy
was producing at its full-employment output. This way, the influence of the
business cycle can be removed from the data, and revenue losses and ex-
penditure hikes due to recessions are thus accounted for. One has to note,
however, that this indicator is not without its problems. In order to calculate
the structural deficit, one has to estimate the potential growth rate of an eco-
nomy which is not directly observable and thus in its calculation very depend-
ent on the assumptions made and the methodology employed.
18   Of course, this kind of definition rules out the possibility for opportunistic
political business cycles (Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff 1990). Hence, their impact
is not being tested here.Pamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  20
ernment balances indicates that these two countries consolidated
their budgets partly via measures that increased revenues. Con-
versely, a higher reduction in total outlays than in the overall deficit
indicates decreasing government revenues.
Table 2: Periods of Fiscal Retrenchment; Definition I









lays (in % GDP)
Belgium 1992-1998 +8,2 -0,4
Denmark 1994-2001 +5,1 -7,4
Finland 1996-2001 +4,7 -9,8
Ireland 1991-2000 +5,3 -12
Italy 1991-1999 +10,8 -7,2
Netherlands 1995-2000 +6,4 -11,1
Spain 1995-2001 +4,7 -5
Sweden 1995-2001 +10,4 -9,7
United Kingdom 1995-2000 +6,2 -5,2
Source: OECD, own calculations
As a control and robustness check, a second definition will be intro-
duced which is related to the one used by Alesina and Ardagna
(1998: 469).
19 Here, we can speak of a fiscal retrenchment, if in one
year a country reduced its cyclically adjusted deficit at least by 2%
of GDP, or if it reduced its deficit by at least 1,5% of GDP in two
consecutive years. The results of this definition are shown in table
3.
Table 3: Periods of Fiscal Retrenchment; Definition II
Country Period of 
Retrenchment
Change   of   the
Cyclically   Adjus-
ted   Government
Balance   (in   %
GDP)
Change   in   Total
Government Out-
lays (in % GDP)
Austria 1996-1997 +3 -2,7
Belgium 1993-1994 +4,5 +2,1
Denmark 1999 +2,1 -1,5
Finland 2000 +3,4 -3
19   Note that Alesina and Ardagna (1998) use the cyclically adjusted primary
balance however.21 European Political Economy Review 
Greece 1991 +4 -3,6
Greece 1994 +3,6 -2,1
Greece 1996-1998 +7,3 -3,8
Italy 1992-1993 +3,3 +1,5
Italy 1997 +4,2 -2,8
Netherlands 1991 +2,9 +0,5
Netherlands 1996 +2,2 -7,1
Portugal 1997 +3,8 +0,5
Sweden 1995-1996 +7,1 -4,9
Sweden 1998 +2,6 -2,5
Sweden 2001 +2 -0,3
United Kingdom 1997-1998 +3,9 -3,2
Source: OECD, own calculations 
As can be easily seen, the two tables exhibit some striking differ-
ences. The reason is that the second definition is both less and more
strict at the same time. It is stricter because it demands a higher an-
nual deficit reduction than Definition I. Therefore, Ireland and
Spain are no longer part of the table, since they lowered their defi-
cits by smaller annual amounts. Another result of this stipulation is
that in all countries the number of consecutive years of consolida-
tion is now two at most. On the other hand, Definition II is less
strict in that it also counts fiscal retrenchments that lasted for only
one or two years, and which could therefore have been reversed the
next year. As a result, countries like Austria, Greece and Portugal
now figure as successful cases of consolidation.
But still, Definition I seems superior to the second one. For one, the
latter does rule out important cases like Ireland, which pursued a
gradual  approach to retrenchment which lasted throughout the
1990s. Yet, Ireland is a prime example of substantial deficit reduc-
tion. Indeed, this approach misses many years of gradual retrench-
ment in all countries. This seems particularly problematic because,
as is visible from the data, most states actually pursued such a
gradual approach over several years. Furthermore, Definition II also
considers very short cases, such as Austria and Portugal, whose ef-
forts were quickly reversed in subsequent years. Therefore, they
should not be counted as cases of successful budgetary retrench-
ment. For all these reasons, emphasis will be put on the first defini-
tion, which seems more capable of accounting for the gradual char-
acter of budgetary consolidation observed in Europe.
In sum, according to Definition I, nine out of fourteen EU countries
were able to engage in lasting fiscal retrenchment during the 1990sPamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  22
and most did so by reducing expenditures. As has been shown be-
fore (See Alesina and Perotti 1997; Alesina and Ardagna 1998;
Alesina, Perotti and Tavares 1998) this was mainly achieved by re-
ducing social transfers and government consumption.
3.2 Data and Variables
The TSCS data consists of 14 EU countries, observed during the
time period  from 1990-2001. The dependent variable is a dummy
which assumes the value “1”, if a given country engaged in fiscal
retrenchment in a given year, while the dummy assumes the value
“0” for all those years in which no deficit reduction took place. For
our two definitions, there are thus two dummies, d1 and d2. This is
the most straightforward way to test for the factors that facilitate or
inhibit retrenchment as it is defined in this paper.
To control for the economic determinants of fiscal retrenchment, a
number of economic variables is employed. The structural general
government balance of the previous year balancet-1 captures the ex-
tent to which current deficit decisions are related to past perform-
ance and path dependencies. It also gives an indication the short
term budgetary pressures.
20 When deciding on future fiscal policy,
decision makers form a prior belief on what the future economic
growth rate is likely to be. It is obvious that higher than expected
growth may lead to a stronger than intended fiscal consolidation.
21
Therefore, to account for the amount of unexpected economic
growth, unexgdp is introduced into the model. This variable simply
subtracts the period mean from the growth rate in a given year. Al-
though this may not be fully satisfactory, it is in the spirit of the pri-
or literature (see e.g. Roubini and Sachs 1989a, b, who use a related
measure). In order to capture the budgetary effects of changing un-
employment dynamics, the variable ue is used which measures the
(OECD-) standardized unemployment rate.
In the period under consideration, all countries faced the constraint
of the Maastricht fiscal convergence criterion. Hence, it might be
20   Since this variable is highly correlated with the overall debt burden, the lat-
ter is not used in the empirical model, even though it is often (maybe spuri-
ously) employed in the literature.
21   Remember that in Definition I, we not only use the structural deficit, which
should be unaffected by that, but also government outlays which will be af-
fected by changes in GDP.23 European Political Economy Review 
possible that all retrenchment decisions were only driven by the ma-
gic three percent target,  ruling out that preferences or institutions
had any influence. To control for this possibility, a dummy variable
named maastricht is introduced which is "1", if in a given year a
country remained below the three per cent deficit target, and "0"
otherwise. Since EU-14 nations have a common trade regime and
do not differ very much in their demographics, factors such as the
old-age dependency ratio or trade openness used in part of the liter-
ature (Franzese 2002a; Woo 2003) are neglected. This is also war-
ranted by the rather brief time span considered here, which is too
short to reflect the impact of changing demographics on social ex-
penditures.
To test for partisan effects, a variable called govcomp is employed.
It indicates whether a given government is dominated by the left or
the right. It ranges from 1 (for hegemony of the right) to 5 (indicat-
ing a left hegemony), while 3 indicates a stalemate.
Several variables are used to capture the effects of veto players on
deficits. First of all, the additive indicator power measures the im-
pact of the federal structure of a country, the number of parliament-
ary chambers, and the regime type (presidential or parliamentarian).
The indicator ranges from 0 to 6, and increases with the concentra-
tion of power in a country. This means that the more veto players
there are, the lower is this indicator’s value. Hence, the highest
value can be found in countries with a unitary structure, no presid-
ent and a unicameral legislature. A value of “0”, on the other hand,
would be found in a country that has a pure presidential system, a
federal structure and two chambers of parliament.
22 Given its distri-
bution and to facilitate interpretation, the variable power is trans-
formed into a dummy variable named veto, which assumes “0” if
there are only few veto players (power > 4), and takes on the value
“1” if there are many veto players (power ≤ 4).  Second, in order to
test hypothesis number 4, the variable nop, which denotes the num-
ber of parties participating in government, is included.
4. Testing the Hypotheses
4.1 Specification and Estimation of the Binary Models
22   Note that there is no such case in the sample employed here because a pure
presidential system does not exist in any EU-14 country.Pamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  24
In this section, the above derived hypotheses are empirically tested
by employing time-series cross-section (TSCS) analyses of a data
set comprising 14 EU countries for the period 1990-2001. There-
fore, logit regression models will be estimated with the dependent
variable being a dummy that simply denotes whether a country in a
given year engaged in successful budgetary consolidation or not.
However, as is well known and widely discussed in the literature
(see for example Beck and Katz 1995a; Beck 2001a), there are a
number pitfalls when analysing TSCS data. To deal with the prob-
lem of panel heteroskedasticity, White robust standard errors (White
1980) are calculated. A more serious but often overlooked problem
(Beck et.al. 1998) is possible temporal dependence in the observa-
tions.  The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2002)
clearly indicates the presence of first-order autocorrelation. As a
remedy, the solution proposed by Beck et.al. (1998) is being fol-
lowed. They note that binary TSCS models are equivalent to
grouped duration data models. As a result, they propose to include
temporal dummies, which in this case are analogous to the baseline
hazards in the grouped duration case and which capture the time
that has passed since the last event. A likelihood ratio test clearly
confirms the need for the inclusion of these dummies.




1exp X  (7)
where Pr(D=1|X) is the conditional probability of a lasting fiscal re-
trenchment D with D=1 if there is a lasting retrenchment in a given
year and country, and D=0 if there is not. The conditional probabil-
ity is given by
X = β0 + β1balancet-1 + β2unexgdpi,t + β3ue i, + β4maat-
richti,t+β5NOPi,t +β6govcompi,t+ β7vetoi,t+ β8govcompi,t*vetoi,t
+kt-t0
i=1,…,14; t=1,…,12 (8)25 European Political Economy Review 
The subscripts i and t denote the country and the year, while k de-
notes the included temporal dummies. Most importantly, besides the
above described variables there is also a multiplicative interaction
term, which captures the conjecture that partisan behaviour is condi-
tional upon the institutional structure of the political system. In oth-
er words, political parties and governments can only pursue their
goals if the political system gives them the freedom to do so. As
discussed before, a high number of veto players may augment par-
tisan policies and may force actors to accept compromises.
4.2 Estimation Results
The results of the estimations are presented in tables 4 and 5. Of the
economic variables, the one year lag of the cyclically adjusted bal-
ance is highly significant and negative across all specifications. This
is what one would expect: higher fiscal deficits (negative balances)
make retrenchment more likely. The unexpected growth variable,
unexgdp, is positive and significant only for the first retrenchment
definition, suggesting that higher than anticipated economic growth
facilitates retrenchment. However, this effect can not be discerned
when looking at Definition II results in table 5. A similar pattern
can be found when looking at the impact of the unemployment rate.
For Definition I, the effect is positive and significant, while for
Definition II it is negative but insignificant. Again, for the former
definition this would imply that higher unemployment raises the
pressure (probably because of mounting social expenditures) to en-
gage in budgetary consolidation, and thereby to act procyclical. The
dummy maastricht remains insignificant throughout.
Table 4: Logit Regression Results – First Definition of Retrenchment




































































 are marginal effects with standard errors in paren-
theses; temporal dummies are not shown.
***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, *Significant at
the 0.1 level
Source: own calculations.
Table 5: Logit Regression Results – Second Definition of Retrenchment




































































 are marginal effects with standard errors in paren-
theses; temporal dummies are not shown.
***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level, *Significant at
the 0.1 level
Source: own calculations.
Looking at the veto players variables, we observe that the number
of government parties nop is positive but hardly significant. The
results thus do not seem to lend support to hypothesis 4. Looking at
column 2 in each table, we find that govcomp is positive and signi-
ficant across all specifications. Given the coding of this variable,
this means that the greater the strength of the left in government, the
more likely are we to observe a fiscal adjustment programme.
23 A
result that also holds, when we employ a conditional fixed effects
logit model (see table A1 in the appendix).
Greatest interest is probably spawned by the interaction term and its
constitutive parts (column 4), which can only be interpreted in a
conditional way (Brambor et.al. 2006). Besides the beta-coeffi-
23   Of course, I would have liked to also specify a full fixed effects model that
also includes the interaction term. However, given that veto does not change
within units, an fixed effects estimation is not possible because the variable
would be perfectly collinear with the unit effects (see table 7 in Annex A).Pamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  28
cients, I also calculated the average marginal effects.
24 When look-
ing at the partisan variable govcomp, we find that, it turns out to be
positive and significant for the cases that veto assumes the value
"0". This means that if there are only few veto players (i.e. political
fragmentation is low), then the higher the share of the left in gov-
ernment, the more likely is a fiscal adjustment to be enacted. This
holds for both definitions of retrenchment.  However, as the negat-
ive signs of the coefficients and marginal effects of the interaction
term show, once there are many veto players (veto=1), an increase
in left-wing party strength in government actually reduces the prob-
ability of a fiscal adjustment. In other words, when power is con-
centrated parties  behave in line with the strategic debt hypothesis
of Persson and Svensson (1989), yet when power is highly dis-
persed, then parties behave according to the traditional partisan
models.
Note that these  results are by and large robust to alternative spe-
cifications, such as introducing further economic variables. In par-
ticular, they are upheld when controlling for the possible effect of
falling interest rates due to the Maastricht convergence process. In-
troducing the lagged overall debt level and long term interest rates
does not alter my findings.
25 
In sum, when we look at the results and compare them with our hy-
potheses, we naturally find that the empirical world is much more
complicated than the neat world of political economy models. Yet,
although the kind of definition for a lasting retrenchment has an im-
pact on the effects of some of the economic control variables, the
findings for the partisan variable and their interaction with the insti-
tutional variable are astoundingly stable across specifications. In-
deed, the coefficients and marginal effects of the interaction term
are very similar.
The findings are somewhat counterintuitive but seem to suggest that
if there are only few veto players, the political leaning of legislators
does not seem to matter statistically. However, with many veto play-
ers present, left- and right wing parties seem to behave in line with




 (see Ai and Norton (2004) for how to calculate mar-
ginal effects in nonlinear models).
25  I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to test this specifica-
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Hypothesis 2, which is based on the debt-as-strategic-variable argu-
ment.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper endeavoured to illuminate the political and institutional
factors that can help explain the occurrence of lasting fiscal re-
trenchment in European Union countries for the time period 1990-
2001. It departed from the assumption of rational decision makers
that are policy-oriented and constrained in their choices and actions
by the institutional environment. Applying standard partisan mod-
els, it was hypothesized that the success of fiscal retrenchment de-
pends on the ideological orientation of the political parties in power.
A second set of hypotheses was derived from the veto players ap-
proach. They predicted that successful fiscal consolidation was a
function of the number of institutional veto players and the size of
the governing coalition. Moreover, it was hypothesized that partisan
behaviour should be conditioned by institutional factors.
The empirical analyses found that the lagged structural budget bal-
ance is the most important economic predictor of retrenchment in
our EU sample. With respect to the institutional and partisan vari-
ables, it turned out that the partisan behaviour of governments is
augmented by the structure of the political decision-making system.
With few veto players, i.e. a high power concentration, left-wing
government seemed more likely to bring about a lasting fiscal re-
trenchment in our sample, thus lending credibility to the model by
Persson and Svensson (1989). Hence, governments dominated by
the left are more likely to engage in fiscal retrenchment. However,
in systems with many veto players, that is, when political power is
dispersed among many actors that can veto each others’ actions, the
right is more prone to consolidate the budget, whereas the left is
less likely to do so. Hypothesis 5 can thus be supported. As a result,
the decision between Hypothesis 1 and 2 seems to depend on the
prevailing institutional context.
These  results   are  surprising   and   revealing   at   the  same   time.
However, they also raise more questions. Most importantly, a sound
theoretical model is still missing, which could potentially explain
the sign switching of the partisan variable once interacted with the
fragmentation of political power. Unfortunately, there is also stillPamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  30
more work to be done on the empirical front. The data is still highly
aggregated and the measure for partisanship is somewhat crude.
What is needed is more micro-founded data. Information on indi-
vidual party positions regarding fiscal policy could not only help to
better categorize them regarding their partisan affiliation but may
also allow to calculate win-sets and cores for different countries
which would dramatically improve our ability to explain fiscal
policy behaviour across countries and time. Of course, there exit
data sets like for example the aforementioned “Centre of Gravity”
indicator (Cusack 1999). The problem with this and other measures
though, is that they all rely on expert judgements that try to assign
values to parties on certain dimensions. While it is not disputed here
that one can easily distinguish parties regarding their overall ideo-
logy and policy goals, it seems highly dubious to attempt to exactly
locate their position in a n-dimensional policy space.
Despite all these disclaimers and drawbacks, the results neverthe-
less have relevance in the policy realm. The findings clearly indic-
ate that successful fiscal retrenchment depends on the preferences
of partisan actors and how they are constrained by the institutional
environment. It clearly emerged that the external Maastricht conver-
gence criterion alone was not a sufficient condition to bring about
successful consolidation. As a result, this paper clearly contradicts
Rotte and Zimmermann (1998) who argued that the consolidation
taking place during the run-up   to the euro introduction, can be
completely attributed to the external constraint of the Maastricht
treaty and its scape-goat effect, as well as the positive attitudes to-
wards Europe by the voters.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Stability and Growth Pact was and
is bound to fail because it cannot alter national domestic policy
preferences sufficiently and does not affect domestic decision mak-
ing processes. To be more effective, the SGP would need to stronger
influence the preferences of policy actors by, for example, mandat-
ing harsh fines that are automatic and not subject to bargaining and
log-rolling in the ECOFIN. National stability pacts could also help
in that respect. The ultimate solution, of course, would be to signi-
ficantly reduce member states authority over fiscal policy, which
currently is not a politically (and perhaps economically) viable op-
tion.31 European Political Economy Review Pamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  32
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Notes: Conditional fixed effects logit regression, coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses; ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at the 0.05 level,
*Significant at the 0.1 level. Source: own calculations.
Table A2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
d1 163 0.404908 0.4923869 0 1
d4 163 0.1411043 0.3492019 0 1
balance t-1 162 -2.669753 3.555646 -15.7 5.7
unexgdp 163 -2.49E-09 2.39617 -8.938037 8.861963
ue 163 8.396994 3.340194 1.7 18.8
nop 163 2.496933 1.572818 1 8
govcomp 163 2.748466 1.353293 1 5
maastricht 163 0.4294479 0.4965228 0 1Pamp: Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions  34
Table A3: Correlation Matrix
d1 d2
balance







balance t-1 0.0652 -0.3318 1
unexgdp 0.3034 -0.028 0.1914 1
ue 0.216 -0.0349 -0.0922 0.058 1
nop 0.2157 -0.0956 0.0858 -0.0278 0.1539 1
govcomp 0.1365 0.3113 0.1088 0.0606 -0.1681 -0.0363 1
maastricht -0.1146 0.145 -0.5745 -0.3084 0.2311 -0.0079 -0.2513 1
Table A4: Definition of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Definition Source
balancet-1 Cyclically adjusted general government balance of
the previous year (in % GDP)
SourceOECD
unexgdp Unexpected real economic rate of growth; calculated
by substracting the period mean from the real GDP
growth rate in a given year
SourceOECD, own
calculations
ue OECD standardized unemployment rate SourceOECD 
maastricht Dummy variable; (nominal) fiscal deficit ≤ 3% then





1: hegmony of right-wing parties, 2: dominace of
right-wing parties, 3: stalemate between left and
right, 4: dominance of left-wing parties, 5: Hege-
mony of left-wing parties
Klaus Armingeon et.
al. (2002); own ad-
justments
nop number of parties in government Thomas Cusack,
Lutz Engelhardt,
The PGL File Col-
lection; European
Journal of Political
Research, various is-35 European Political Economy Review 
sues
veto High or low number of veto players
veto=1, if power ≤4
veto=0, if power >4
Derived from the
variable power 
 power Additive index called consisting of three compon-
ents, that are each coded from 0-3, according to in-
creasing power cocentration (and decreasing number
of veto players):
1. Chamber System (bicameral System=0, weak
bicameral system=1, unicameral system=2)
2. Regime Type (pure presidential=0, 2emi-presiden-
tial =1, parliamentarian=2 )
3. Federal-Unitary Index (federal system, subsidiary
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